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THE NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT TO
ADOPT THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DEFINITION OF
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
INTRODUCTION
"Before 1965, healthcare services [in America] were described as
'dual tracked': the wealthy received care from private physicians while
the poor-if they accessed service at all-received care in ambulatory
clinics and emergency rooms."'
This perception changed in 1965 when Congress created the Medi-
caid program.' Since then, scholars and courts have examined whether
Medicaid creates an individually enforceable right to health care. Courts
are split on which, if any, provisions of the Medicaid statute create a
federally enforceable right, but generally agree that Medicaid eligible
individuals have a federally enforceable right to receive benefits with
reasonable promptness, services comparable in amount, duration and
scope to non-beneficiaries, and early and periodic screening, diagnostic
and treatment services (EPSDT) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3 While courts
generally hold that there is a federally enforceable right to prompt and
comparable medical assistance, courts have failed to provide a uniform
remedy when that right is violated. The Medicaid statute defines the
term "medical assistance" as financial assistance, however some courts
interpret the statute differently.4 Some circuits require states to provide
actual medical assistance to eligible Medicaid recipients,5 while other
circuits reject the idea that states must provide actual medical services,
1. Abigail R. Moncrieff, Comment, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the "Equal
Access" Provision, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 673, 675 (2006).
2. Medicaid Statute, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a-1396v (2008). Congress created the Medicaid
program by amending the Social Security Act, and as such, the program remains in the Social Secu-
rity Act.
3. See Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th
Cir. 2007) (assuming, without deciding, that the EPSDT requirement creates a federally enforceable
right); Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2006) (agreeing with the Ninth and
Third Circuits which have held the reasonable promptness and comparability requirements create a
federally enforceable right); Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 719 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (affirming district
court holding that the reasonable promptness clause of the Medicaid Act is enforceable under 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2007)). But see Sanders ex. rel. Rayl v. Kan. Dep't of Soc. and Rehab. Servs., 317
F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1250 (D. Kan. 2004) (holding that the reasonable promptness requirement does
not create an enforceable right).
4. § 1396d(a) (defining medical assistance as "payment of part or all of the cost of the fol-
lowing care and services").
5. See Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 89 (1 st Cir. 2002); Chiles, 136 F.3d at 719.
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and instead hold that the Medicaid program requires states only to pro-
vide financial assistance to eligible Medicaid recipients.6
This comment addresses the differing interpretations of medical as-
sistance as defined in the Medicaid statute. Part I begins with a brief
historical analysis of public health assistance and the Medicaid program.
Next, Part II examines federal circuit court opinions that interpret medi-
cal assistance. Part III then proceeds with an analysis of why the United
States Supreme Court should grant certiorari to define medical assis-
tance. The analysis concludes with an explanation of how defining medi-
cal assistance as financial assistance best serves the Medicaid eligible
population and accomplishes the goals of the Medicaid program.
I. THE HISTORY OF MEDICAID AND MEDICAID TODAY
Medicaid is a federal and state partnership program that provides fi-
nancial assistance for medical care to the "most vulnerable populations in
society."7 Between 37.5 million and 55 million people 8 are covered by
the Medicaid program, including poor children, parents, seniors, and
disabled persons. 9 The Medicaid program is an opt-in program; Con-
gress does not mandate state participation, however all 50 states and the
District of Columbia participate in the program.' °
A. Public Health Assistance Prior to Medicaid
Prior to the creation of Medicaid, most sources of funding in the
health care industry were private."' The creation of Medicaid began after
the Second World War, when the focus on medical care in America
shifted from infection and treatment to chronic disease and research.
12
Initially, federal government funding for medicine supported research
and infrastructure rather than medical care.' 3  However, in 1960, the
Kennedy administration began to discuss community based medical ser-
vices as a way to combat poverty. 14 In response to political pressure to
6. See Mandy R., 464 F.3d at 1146; Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 540 (6th
Cir. 2006); Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 2003).
7. HEALTH CARE FINANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, A PROFILE OF MEDICAID: CHARTBOOK 2000 6 (2000), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/TheChartSeries/downloads/2Tchartbk.pdf. As evident in this definition,
the Medicaid statute and agencies responsible for administering Medicaid often consider themselves
responsible only for financial assistance.
8. Sidney D. Watson, The View from the Bottom: Consumer-Directed Medicaid and Cost
Shifting to Patients, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 403, 405 (2007).
9. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit
Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 5, 5 (2006); see also ELICIA J. HERZ, CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS: MEDICAID: A PRIMER 12, available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33202_20051222.pdf (last updated Jan. 24, 2007) ("In FY 2006, a
total of 63.2 million people were enrolled in Medicaid at some time during the year.").
10. HERZ, supra note 9, at 1.
11. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 338-39 (1982).
12. Id. at 336-40.
13. Id. at 338-51.
14. Id. at 365-66.
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provide medical care for certain vulnerable populations, Congress passed
the Kerr-Mills Act. 5
The Kerr-Mills Act established a federally funded program to pro-
vide elderly individuals with financial assistance for uncovered medical
expenses. 16 Under the Act, states provided up to half of the funding for
medical services for the elderly poor. 17 The Kerr-Mills program was
intended to allow each state to establish a medical care program so that
every aged individual could have adequate medical care.18 The Kerr-
Mills Act met opposition because of its inconsistent goals. On one hand
the legislation encouraged states to create individual programs to avoid a
national health care scheme, but on the other hand the legislation was a
commitment to national responsibility for medical welfare.19
While the Kerr-Mills Act addressed the policy of providing medical
services to a limited number of aged poor, it "rocked no boats" in com-
parison to other proposed medical welfare programs.2 0 Because the Act
was a moderate attempt to provide health care to individuals, neither
conservatives nor liberals were happy with the policy,21 and both politi-
cal parties introduced myriad proposals to modify the Kerr-Mills Act.22
In an effort to avoid public disappointment, Representative Mills pro-
posed combining some of these proposals into a three-tiered medical
welfare system.23 The resulting proposal created a mandatory hospital
insurance program under Social Security (Medicare Part A), government
reimbursement voluntary insurance for physician bills (Medicare Part B),
and expanded federal assistance to the states for medical care for the
poor (Medicaid).24
B. The Creation of Medicaid and the Federal-State Partnership
Congress amended the Social Security Act in 1965 to adopt Repre-
sentative Mills's proposal and in doing so created the Medicaid pro-
gram.2 5 The creation of Medicaid "reflected Congress's decision to 'lib-
eralize and extend' [the Kerr-Mills system] of federal grants to states for
specific health care purposes. 2 6 Additionally, the creation of the Medi-
15. Id. at 368; Kerr-Mills Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 87-778, 74 Stat. 924 (1960) (codi-
fied as amended at I.R.C. § 3126 (2008)); I.R.C. § 3308 (2008); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1324 (2008); 42
U.S.C.A. § 1312 (2008).
16. HEALTH CARE FINANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, supra note 7, at 6.
17. STARR, supra note 11, at 369.
18. ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE
STUDY OF MEDICAID 29 (2003).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 28.
21. Id. at 31.
22. STARR, supra note 11, at 369.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Medicaid Statute, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a-1396v (2008).
26. Rosenbaum, supra note 9, at 9.
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caid program embodied Congress's intent to provide "mainstream medi-
cal services" to the poor and disabled.27
While Medicaid is a federal-state partnership in which states elect to
participate,28 if a state chooses to participate in the Medicaid program, it
must develop a medical assistance program that complies with federal
requirements.2 9 The federal requirements can be split into two classifi-
cations: financial requirements and categorical requirements.3° Some of
the groups states must cover are only eligible if they meet both the finan-
cial and categorical requirements. Groups that states must provide ser-
vices to because of financial requirements include poor families that
qualify for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) cash
assistance program, and families that are transitioning from welfare to
work.3 1 Groups that states must provide services to because of categori-
cal requirements include some legal permanent residents like new refu-
gees.32 Groups that states must provide services to because of a combi-
nation of financial and categorical requirements include pregnant women
and children whose families fall below at least 100 percent of the federal
poverty level, poor individuals with disabilities, and poor seniors who
qualify for cash benefits from the Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
program.
33
In addition, states may choose to provide Medicaid coverage to op-
tional additional populations. 34  Optional coverage includes long-term
care, care for the medically needy, care for the working disabled, and
care for other poverty-related groups.3 5 Long term care coverage is lim-
ited to persons who require institutional care or who require care in
community settings if they fall 300 percent below the SSI income re-
quirements. 36 The medically needy are individuals who fit into one of
the categorical groups but do not meet the financial requirements.37 The
poverty related groups include pregnant women and children who do not
meet the financial requirements.38
27. Moncrieff, supra note 1, at 675.
28. See e.g., KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICAID: A TIMELINE OF KEY DEVELOPMENTS (2008), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaidtimeline/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
29. Moncrieff, supra note 1, at 675.




34. CENTER FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, MEDICAID PROGRAM: GENERAL INFORMATION, TECHNICAL SUMMARY 3, avail-
able at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidGenlnfo/03_TechnicalSummary.asp#TopOfPage (last
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Although states must provide coverage to the federally-mandated
groups, states retain much flexibility in "determining requirements for
eligibility, in establishing the scope of benefits coverage, and in setting
rates for reimbursement. 3 9 Because states retain so much flexibility,
there is no typical program; rather, there are "essentially 56 different




The joint federal-state nature of the Medicaid program requires
many different agencies to administer Medicaid. On the federal level,
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) administers
Medicaid. 41 Each state has its own executive body to administer the state
aspect of the Medicaid program.
Medicaid is jointly funded by the states and the federal government.
States provide the initial funding for the program and the federal gov-
ernment reimburses states for a portion of the state's costs. 42 The federal
government provides fifty to eighty-three percent of the state program
costs. 43 The federal reimbursement funding is based on each state's av-
erage yearly per capita income. As a result, the federal reimbursement
rate varies from state to state and from year to year.44 States generally
determine their own reimbursement rates for medical service providers.45
Currently, the federal Medicaid eligibility rules provide financial
assistance to the poor, elderly, and children and parents in working fami-
lies.46 Generally, Medicaid covers "inpatient and outpatient hospital
services; doctors' and nurse practitioners' services; nursing home care;
rural health clinic services; home health-care services; laboratory and X-
ray charges; and transportation to and from health-care providers. '47
While states must provide the mandatory services outlined in the
Medicaid statute, states also retain much flexibility to administer optional
programs as well as waiver programs. Optional services include interme-
diate care facilities for the developmentally disabled (ICF/DD or
ICF/MR).48 Waiver programs are services not enumerated in the Medi-
39. Moncrieff, supra note 1, at 675-76.
40. MEDICAID PROGRAM: GENERAL INFORMATION, TECHNICAL SUMMARY, supra note 34.
41. 2 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, CENTERS FOR MEDICAID & MEDICARE
SERVICES 301 (Jeffrey Lehman & Shirelle Phelps eds., 2nd ed. 2005). The Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) preceded CMS.
42. See HERZ, supra note 9, at 6.
43. See id. at 6.
44. MEDICAID PROGRAM: GENERAL INFORMATION, TECHNICAL SUMMARY, supra note 34.
45. See HERZ, supra note 9, at 8.
46. Watson, supra note 8, at 410.
47. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LEGAL GUIDE FOR AMERICANS OVER FIFTY 166-67
(2006).
48. Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 714 (11 th Cir. 1998).
2008]
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caid statute that states provide in order to further the goals of the Medi-
caid program. To provide waiver programs, states must obtain waivers
from CMS. 49 Approved Medicaid waiver programs are not subject to the
same requirements as mandatory or optional services.50 In an effort to
allow states to find less expensive and perhaps more effective systems of
care, CMS permits waiver programs "to allow states to experiment with
methods of care, or to provide care on a targeted basis, without adhering
to the strict mandates of the Medicaid system.",51 A subcategory of
waiver programs is the model waiver program. Model waiver programs
exist as a way for states to exercise flexibility to find the best programs
for the populations they treat.5 2 Model waiver programs are limited to
serving no more than 200 individuals at any one time. 3 A common
waiver is the home and community-based service (HCBS) waiver.54
Under HCBS waivers, "individuals who would otherwise be treated in an
institutional setting" are instead treated in their homes or in small home-
based facilities.55
States-whether they provide the minimum mandatory services, in-
clude additional services, or provide waiver programs-must follow cer-
tain federal requirements regarding the nature of care provided. The
Medicaid statute provides that each state's plan for medical assistance
must provide "for making medical assistance available [to all Medicaid
eligible individuals]. 56 Among other requirements, states must furnish
this medical assistance with "reasonable promptness to all eligible indi-
viduals' 57 and the medical assistance "shall not be less in amount, dura-
49. HERz, supra note 9, at 9.
50. Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 82 (1 st Cir. 2002).
51. Id at 82-83.
In theory, waiver plans are expenditure-neutral; the average estimated per capita expendi-
ture under the waiver plans must not be more than the average estimated expenditure ab-
sent the waiver program. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(2)(D) (2007). In practice, the waiver
programs may be costly to the states, because even though the individuals served by the
waiver plan are no longer being served by nursing homes or other care facilities, other pa-
tients may take those nursing home spots. Many patients not currently being served un-
der Medicaid may also apply for the waiver program. The states thus have a financial in-
centive to keep their waiver programs small, or at least, to begin with small programs and
grow them incrementally.
Id. (citations omitted).
52. See U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, Medicaid State Waiver Program Demonstration Projects - General Information, Over-
view, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGI/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
53. 42 C.F.R. § 441.305(b)(1) (2008).
54. See, e.g., Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1141-42 (1Oth Cir. 2006); Bryson, 308 F.3d
at 82; see also Jane Perkins & Randolph T. Boyle, Addressing Long Waits for Home and Commu-
nity-Based Care Through Medicaid and the ADA, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 117, 126 (2001) (explaining
that in 2001 there were about 240 home and community based waiver programs nationwide).
55. Bryson, 308 F.3d at 82.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2006).
57. Id. § 1396a(a)(8).
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tion, or scope than the medical assistance made available to any other
such individual. 58
While the Medicaid statute requires states to provide medical assis-
tance with reasonable promptness and comparability, courts disagree as
to whether the medical assistance provided must be actual medical ser-
vices or financial assistance.
II. MEDICAL ASSISTANCE: ACTUAL SERVICES OR FINANCIAL SUPPORT?
The existence of a circuit split was recognized by the Third Circuit
in Sabree v. Richman.59 The Third Circuit remarked in a footnote that
"there appears to be a disagreement among our sister courts of appeals as
to whether, pursuant to Medicaid, a state must merely provide financial
assistance to obtain covered services, or provide the services them-
selves., 60 The Third Circuit did not address whether medical assistance
meant financial assistance or medical services.6 1 Since the Third Cir-
cuit's observation, the Tenth Circuit has twice addressed the issue of
what medical assistance means, and has concluded that medical assis-
tance means financial assistance.
62
A. Circuits Holding that Medical Assistance Means Actual Services
1. Eleventh Circuit: Doe v. Chiles
63
The Chiles court's main consideration was whether the reasonable
promptness requirement was a federally enforceable right.64  The Elev-
enth Circuit found that the reasonable promptness requirement did create
an individually enforceable right, and in its holding found that medical
assistance as described in the Medicaid statute meant actual medical ser-
vices .65
a. Facts and Procedural History
The Chiles plaintiffs were a group of developmentally disabled in-
dividuals on waiting lists for Intermediate Care Facilities for the Devel-
opmentally Disabled (ICF/MR).66 The plaintiffs claimed that the Florida
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services failed to provide
Medicaid assistance with reasonable promptness.67 The plaintiffs alleged
they had been waiting for over five years for the services they needed,
58. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)(i).
59. 367 F.3d 180, 181 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2004).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir.
2007); Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1143-44 (10th Cir. 2006).
63. 136 F.3d 709 (1 Ith Cir. 1998).
64. See id. at 715-19.
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and the State admitted that the waiting period was several years long.68
The district court found for the plaintiffs and enjoined the Florida Medi-
caid Administrators. 69  The administrators appealed from the district
court's judgment. 0
b. Circuit Court Holding
In holding that the reasonable promptness language created a fed-
eral enforceable right under § 1983, the court used the three part Blessing
test.7 1 First, the court concluded that the plain language of the Medicaid
Act, "assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all
eligible individuals," demonstrated that Congress intended the provision
to benefit the plaintiffs.72 Second, the court concluded that the reason-
able promptness requirement was "sufficiently specific and definite"
enough for a court to evaluate.7 3 The court noted "delays of 'several
years' . . . are far outside the realm of reasonableness. 74 Finally, the
court concluded that the language of the Medicaid statue was "cast in
mandatory rather than precatory terms. 75
After holding that the Medicaid statute did create an enforceable
right under § 1983, the court noted that '[medical] assistance under the
[Medicaid] plan' has been defined as medical services. The [State] is
obliged to furnish medical services ....,76 The court did not provide
additional reasoning as to why it interpreted medical assistance as mean-
ing actual medical services.
2. First Circuit: Bryson v. Shumway
77
The First Circuit considered whether the reasonable promptness
provision required states to fill all available waiver program slots.
78
While the court did not expressly consider what medical assistance
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 712.
71. Id. at 713. The court explained the Blessing test as follows:
In order to seek redress through § 1983, however, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a
federal right, not merely a violation of the federal law. We have traditionally looked at
three factors when determining whether a particular statutory provision gives rise to a
federal right. First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit
the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by
the statute is not so "vague and amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial
competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the
States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in
mandatory rather than precatory terms.
Id.
72. Id. at 715.
73. ld. at 717.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 718.
76. Id. at 711.
77. 308 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2002).
78. Id. at81.
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meant, the court's holding, in effect, implied that actual services were
required when a state had unfilled waiver program slots.
79
a. Facts and Procedural History
The plaintiffs, Bonnie Bryson and Claire Shepardson, represented a
class of individuals who were being treated in New Hampshire in various
treatment facilities. 80 Bryson and Shepardson were eligible for care un-
der the Medicaid program because they both suffered from acquired
brain disorders.
81
New Hampshire Medicaid administered a model waiver program
providing home and community based services (HCBS) for individuals
with such acquired brain disorders. 82 New Hampshire's HCBS program
initially served only 15 individuals in its first year, but the goal was to
increase the number of slots up to 130.83 There were always more appli-
cants for the HCBS programs than available slots, so the State created a
waiting list for the services. The number of eligible individuals on the
waitlist ranged from 25 to 87.84 The plaintiffs applied for the HCBS
program but were never admitted and were instead placed on the waiting
list.85
The plaintiffs sued the State administrators of the Medicaid program
alleging that New Hampshire failed to fill the available HCBS slots
within a reasonable time.86 The district court granted summary judgment
for the plaintiffs, finding that the state violated Medicaid's reasonable
promptness requirement.87 The State appealed the district court's ruling.
b. Circuit Court Holding
The Third Circuit applied the three-part Blessing test and found that
the reasonable promptness provision of the Medicaid statute created a
federally-enforceable cause of action under § 1983.88 In doing so, the
court noted that "[once] the waiver plan is created and approved, it be-
79. Id. at 89.
80. Id. at81.
81. Id. Acquired brain disorders "manifest before age sixty, are neither congenital nor caused
by birth trauma, and present 'a severe and life-long disabling condition which significantly impairs a
person's ability to function in society."' Id.
82. Id. at 82-83.
83. Id. at 83.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 81. Plaintiff's also alleged that "if New Hampshire set up a model program at all,
Congress required that the waiver program have at least as many slots as the number of applicants,
up to a limit of 200." Id. The court ruled that the Medicaid statute did not require states to provide
services for the number of individuals who desired such services, but rather that states were free to
set up model waiver programs serving as many individuals as each state desired, as long as that
number did not exceed 200. Id. at 86. This discussion is beyond the scope of this comment.
87. Id. at 84.
88. Id. at 89.
20081
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comes part of the state plan and therefore subject to federal law; the
waiver plans must meet all requirements not expressly waived.,
8 9
After finding a federally-enforceable right, the court considered
whether New Hampshire had violated the reasonable promptness re-
quirement by failing to fill unfilled waiver slots in a reasonable amount
of time.9° The court remanded this issue to the trial court because there
was no factual record as to whether unfilled waiver slots existed.91
While the court did not expressly decide the issue, it did discuss it. In
doing so, the Third Circuit said:
[When] an individual ceases to use the waiver plan services, there is
necessarily a time gap while an individual on the waiting list is cho-
sen to take the unfilled slot and while services are made available.
Because of that lag in time, the fact that some slots are unfilled may
be consistent with New Hampshire diligently filling the empty slots
with reasonable promptness. It may also indicate that New Hamp-
shire is not being reasonably prompt in its provision of medical assis-
tance. 
92
The Third Circuit, then, in dicta, implied that New Hampshire must fill
available slots. 93 By articulating the requirement that New Hampshire
fill available slots in its waiver program, the Third Circuit indirectly held
that states must provide actual medical services in order to discharge
their duty of providing medical assistance with reasonable promptness.
B. Circuits Holding that Medical Assistance Means Financial Support
1. Seventh Circuit: Bruggeman v. Blagojevich
94
The Bruggeman Court also examined the issue of whether the Illi-
nois Medicaid program violated Medicaid's statutory requirement of
reasonable promptness of medical services because there were more va-
cancies in Intermediate Care Facilities for the Developmentally Disabled
(ICF/DD) in the southern part of the state than the northern part of the
state.95
a. Facts and Procedural History
The Bruggeman plaintiffs were seven developmentally disabled
adults living at home with their parents in the Chicago area.96 The par-
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 89-90.
92. Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
93. Id.
94. 324 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2003).
95. Id. at 910. The court also considered whether the disproportional distribution of ICF/DD
facilities violated the Rehabilitation act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. These claims are
beyond the scope of this comment.
96. Id. at 908.
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ents wanted the plaintiffs to live in ICF/DD facilities; however, the facili-
ties with vacancies were located in the southern part of Illinois.97 The
parents did not want to send their children to those facilities because of
the time and expense they would incur in traveling to visit their chil-
dren.98
The plaintiffs brought suit against the state officials who, in their of-
ficial capacity, were in charge of administering Illinois' Medicaid pro-
gram. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants "prefer[red] the plaintiffs
to live at home because it would cost the state more to pay for their care
in an institution, and so the defendants refuse[d] to write letters urging
authorization of additional ICF/DDs in the northern part of the state
.... "99 Without these letters from state officials, the agency responsible
for authorizing additional facilities would refuse such authorizations.100
The plaintiffs argued that by refusing to write the necessary letters, de-
fendants violated the reasonable promptness and comparability require-
ments because no new facilities would be authorized. 10'
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs Medicaid claim for lack
of standing, deciding "that the plaintiffs have no right to live in an
ICFiDD that is near their parents' home."'1 2 The court found that be-
cause this right did not exist, there was no injury and thus no standing.
0 3
b. Circuit Court Holding
The Seventh Circuit began by examining standing. The court found
that the district court's ruling that there was no injury was based on the
merits of the case rather than jurisdictional grounds.' 4 Instead, the court
found that "if [plaintiffs] claim a right to a wider choice of ICF/DD va-
cancies than the defendants are willing to permit the planning agency to
authorize, then they are likely to have standing, because the absence of
the plan they seek is a denial of such an entitlement.' 1 5 After finding




98. Id. at 908-09.
99. Id. at 909.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(1), (8), (10)(B)(i), (19), (23) (2006)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 909-10.
105. Id. at 909. The court went on to note that the plaintiffs "seek merely a plan, which might
not lead to the increase in the ICF/DD capacity in their immediate geographic area." Id. This specu-
lative situation is what left the court to decide that Plaintiffs only likely had standing. The court
nonetheless found standing because the possibility that new ICF/DD facilities would not increase
vacancy was "not so speculative as to negate standing, which is a matter of probabilities rather than
certainties." Id. (citing North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1991)).
106. Id. at 910.
2008]
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The court first addressed the statutory requirement of reasonable
promptness to medical assistance. The court found that the requirement
was "not infringed by the maldistribution . . . of ICF/DDs across the
state." 10 7 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs did not require relocation
to the southern part of the state because it was not "as if plaintiffs re-
quire[d] relocation to such a facility on an emergency basis, in which
event the remoteness of any such facility from their homes . . . would
deprive them of prompt treatment."'' 08  The court then considered the
situation where the plaintiffs would need to be transported in an emer-
gency situation, and in doing so, determined that the Medicaid statute
only requires financial assistance.'09 The court said:
Even if they did require emergency treatment, their theory of viola-
tion would be a considerable stretch because the statutory reference
to "assistance" appears to have reference to financial assistance
rather than to actual medical services, though the distinction was
missed in Bryson v. Shumway and Doe v. Chiles. Medicaid is a pay-
ment scheme, not a scheme for state-provided medical assistance, as
through state-owned hospitals. The regulations that implement the
provision indicate that what is required is a prompt determination of
eligibility and prompt provision of funds to eligible individuals to
enable them to obtain the covered medical services they need ... [A]
requirement of prompt treatment would amount to a direct regulation
of medical services.110
The court then addressed the Plaintiffs' claims that the State was
failing to provide identical ICF/DD services because the number of va-
cancies in the southern part of the state "favors the people living there
over those who live in the northern part.""' To fix this problem, the
plaintiffs argued there should be a ICF/DD within thirty miles from their
homes, and that that ICF/DD must be specifically tailored to the Medi-
caid beneficiaries' needs." 2 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' de-
sires were "[a]n unattainable goal that cannot rationally be attributed to
the statute."
113
The court also considered the plaintiffs' argument that the defen-
dants' refusal to write the necessary letters violated the "right to obtain a
needed medical service from a provider 'who undertakes to provide him
such services.""'14 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the




110. Id. (internal citations omitted).
111. Id.
112. Id. at910-11.
113. Id. at 911 (citing Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1011 (11th Cir. 1997)).
114. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A § 1396a(a)(23) (2008)).
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facilities, not to require the creation or authorization of new facili-
ties."
115
Overall, the court found that the Medicaid claims lacked merit, and
explicitly stated that Medicaid is only a payment scheme."l
6
2. Sixth Circuit: Westside Mothers v. Olszewski
l l7
In Westside Mothers, the court directly considered what medical as-
sistance requires, and the Sixth Circuit held that medical assistance
meant financial assistance."
8
a. Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiffs, Westside Mothers, and other advocacy groups along with
five Medicaid beneficiaries brought suit against the defendants-those
responsible for administering Michigan's Medicaid program. The plain-
tiffs brought suit under § 1983 alleging that that the defendants had failed
to implement an appropriate Medicaid system by (1) refusing to provide
comprehensive screening to eligible individuals; (2) not requiring pro-
viders to provide diagnostic services and treatment; (3) failing to effec-
tively inform eligible patients of the available treatment and screening;
(4) failing to provide transportation to physician visits; and (5) by devel-
oping a program that lacked the capacity to provide care to eligible chil-
dren. 119
The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the
case, holding that Medicaid was a contract between the state and the fed-
eral government so the proper defendant was really the state instead of
the state officials.120 The court dismissed the case because the state was
protected from suit by sovereign immunity.' 2' The plaintiffs appealed the
dismissal and the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, finding
that the Medicaid statute did create an enforceable cause of action
against the state officials.
1 22
On remand, the district court granted in part the defendant's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 123 In doing so, the court concluded
that the Medicaid Act "[requires] the State to pay some or all of the costs
of certain medical services available to eligible individuals, but [does
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 910-11.
117. Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2006).
118. Id. at 539-40.
119. Id. at 536.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 536-37.
123. Id. at 537.
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not] require the State provide the services directly."'124  The plaintiffs
again appealed from the district court's dismissal.
b. Circuit Court Holding
The Sixth Circuit considered "whether the individual rights to
'medical assistance' ... [impose] an obligation on the State to provide
services directly." 125  The court recognized that while other courts inter-
preted the medical assistance provision differently, the statute clearly
provided a definition. "Medical assistance" the court wrote, "means
'payment of part or all of the cost of the [enumerated] services' to eligi-
ble individuals."",126  The plaintiffs encouraged the court to adopt a
broader interpretation of medical assistance, but the court relied on the
language and structure of the Medicaid statute to reject the plaintiffs'
suggestion. 127  In rejecting a broader interpretation of the statute, the
Sixth Circuit wrote:
The most reasonable interpretation of [the reasonable promptness re-
quirement] is that all eligible individuals should have the opportunity
to apply for medical assistance, i.e., financial assistance, and that
such medical assistance, i.e., financial assistance, shall be provided to
the individual with reasonable promptness. The most reasonable in-
terpretation of [the comparability requirement] is that medical assis-
tance, i.e., financial assistance, must be provided for at least the
[mandatory] care and services listed in [various] paragraphs [of the
Medicaid statute].
128
The Sixth Circuit's explicit holding set the stage for the Tenth Cir-
cuit's consideration of the same issue.
3. Tenth Circuit: Mandy R. ex rel. Mr. and Mrs. R. v. Owens'
29
The Mandy R. court considered three issues associated with the
Medicaid Act: reasonable promptness, comparability, and sufficient
payments. 130 The court held that the Medicaid requirements of reasonable
promptness and comparability did not require the state to provide actual
medical services to Medicaid recipients. 13' The court discussed the suf-
124. Id. at 539.
125. Id. at 539-40.
126. Id. at 540 (citing 42 U.S.C.A § 1396d(a) (2008)).
127. Id.
128. Id. The court also addressed whether 42 U.S.C.A § 1396a(a)(30) (2008), the requirement
that state Medicaid programs must provide access to eligible children and § 1396a(a)(43)(A), the
requirement that States provide notice to eligible individuals about certain programs, created feder-
ally enforceable rights. Id. at 541. The court concluded that § 1396a(a)(30) did not create a feder-
ally enforceable right but that § 1396a(a)(43)(A) may. Id. at 544. Further discussion about these
arguments is beyond the scope of this comment.
129. Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006).
130. Id. at 1141.
131. Id.
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ficient payments requirement separately, and this comment does not ad-
dress that analysis.
a. Facts and Procedural History
Colorado offers a number of Medicaid-funded services for devel-
opmentally disabled persons. The services at issue here were Intermedi-
ate Care Facilities for the Mentally Retarded (ICF/MR) and Home and
Community Based Services (HCBS).132  Colorado had three ICF/MR
facilities, which are larger institutional settings "generally reserved for
persons with extreme needs."133 ICF/MRs in Colorado served, at the
time of suit, approximately 86 individuals. 134 HCBS programs, in con-
trast, were smaller waiver programs that served between one and eight
people per program.' 35 HCBS programs are less isolating and less ex-
pensive than ICF/MR programs. 136 At the time of the trial, approximately
3,800 developmentally disabled individuals were being treated in HCBS
programs. 
37
During the same time, approximately 733 individuals were waiting
for enrollment in HCBS programs, but the services were unavailable.
38
In contrast, only 21 individuals were waiting for enrollment in an
ICF/MR program. 1
39
The plaintiffs, six developmentally disabled individuals seeking
ICF/MR services (an association of service providers), brought suit
against the state alleging that it violated the Medicaid Act by failing to
provide the developmentally disabled with comprehensive residential
services that meet the statutory "requirements of reasonable promptness
and comparability."'40 The district court held a four day bench trial and
found for the state. 14 1 The plaintiffs appealed.
142
b. Circuit Court Holding
The court began by assuming that the statutory requirements of rea-
sonable promptness and comparability conferred a federally-enforceable









140. Id. at 1142-43 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 1142.
142. Id.
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other circuit courts that addressed the issue found a private right ex-
isted.
43
The court characterized the plaintiffs' claims that the state was not
providing medical assistance with reasonable promptness and compara-
bility as one problem: "that the individual plaintiffs are not receiving the
comprehensive residential services they need."' 44 In order to determine
the merits of the claim, the court began by asking "[w]hat is the 'medical
assistance' that the state must provide promptly and equally?"' 45 In de-
fining medical assistance, the court considered the statutory definition,
statutory "contextual clues," and policy rationale. 146 This analysis led the
court to conclude that the Medicaid Act required states to provide finan-
cial assistance rather than actual medical services.
47
First, the court looked at the definition of medical assistance as de-
fined in the Medicaid Act. The Act "defines 'medical assistance' as
'payment of part of all of the cost of the [described] care and ser-
vices.""' 148 The court reasoned that because the definition provided in the
statute "mention[ed] payment for, but not provision of services" that
medical assistance only included financial assistance. 149 Thus, the court
concluded, the Medicaid Act only requires participating states to "pay
promptly and evenhandedly for medical services when the state is pre-
sented a bill" rather than provide medical services promptly and even-
handedly.
150
In reaching its conclusion based on the statutory definition, the
court relied on the Seventh Circuit's interTretation of medical assistance
and recognized the potential circuit split.' 1 In a footnote, the Tenth Cir-
cuit recognized that while there may be a circuit split, it is not explicit. It
noted "two circuits have held that 'medical assistance' requires only fi-
nancial assistance .... Another circuit has reserved the question ....
Without expressly addressing the issue, two other circuits appear to have
treated the statute as requiring the provision of actual services."'
52
Second, the court quickly rejected each of the plaintiffs' arguments
that five specific "contextual clues" in the Medicaid Act pointed to the
143. Id. at 1142-43 ("Since the Supreme Court clarified when a statute creates an enforceable
private right in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)... several courts have considered
whether one or both of these subsections [42 U.S.C.A § 1396a(a)(8) (2008) reasonable promptness
and § 1396a(a)(10) comparability] creates an enforceable private right. Each has concluded that the
provision in question does.").
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1143-45.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1143 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A § 1396d(a)) (emphasis added).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1143 n.2.
152. Id.
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interpretation that medical assistance means actual medical services.'
53
Plaintiffs first alleged that section 1396a(a)(2) of the Act, which requires
states to "assure that lack of adequate funds from local sources" will not
decrease the quality of care under Medicaid, meant states must provide
medical assistance.1 54 The court rejected this argument, noting that the
provision only mentions funding and "says nothing about providing the
services themselves.' 55  Secondly, plaintiffs alleged the comparability
requirement requires states to provide beneficiaries with actual medical
services because the provision requires that the "'medical assistance' []
be the same 'in amount, duration or scope."",156 The court found that the
comparability provision did not indicate which meaning should be given
to medical assistance because the provision "can apply to the payment
for services no less logically than to the provision of services." '157 Third,
the plaintiffs argued that the requirement that states provide care and
services 'in a manner consistent with simplicity of administration in the
best interests of the recipients"' required the state to provide actual
medical services. 158 The court declined to adopt this argument because it
saw "no logical end" to state provided care if the state was required to
provide all actual medical services that were in the best interest of the
recipients. '" Fourth, plaintiffs argued that the language in the state's
waiver application promised to provide ICF/MR services "with 'No
Limitations.,, 1 60 The court rebuffed this argument, noting that by choos-
ing the "no limitations" language, "the State was abjuring limits such as
length of ICF/MR services for which it would pay, but there [was] no
indication that . . . the State promised to build, staff, and maintain as
many ICFs/MR as would be needed to meet the demand in Colorado."
16'
Lastly, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the waiver pro-
gram was a "commitment to ensuring that every eligible patient re-
ceive[d] services either from ICFs/MR or HCBS. 162 The court reasoned
that the waiver application did not confer responsibility upon the state to
ensure that ICF/MR or HCBS are available for every individual who
desired such a program.
163
Third, the court rejected plaintiffs' public policy argument for de-
fining medical assistance as actual medical services.1 64 Plaintiffs argued
that by accepting federal funds for Medicaid, the state was "promising to
153. Id. at 1144.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)(i) (2008)).
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting § 1396a(a)(19)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
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pay for services for the developmentally disabled and then suppressing
the supply of these services."' 65 The plaintiffs' only argument support-
ing the assertion that the state was suppressing the supply of ICF/MR
facilities was that the state "ha[d] discouraged efforts to build new
ICFs/MR by responding coolly to initial inquiries."'166 The court found
this "too nebulous a basis to support a legal claim" and refused to honor
plaintiffs' suggestions that the state become the hospital of last resort or
that the state include a good faith requirement in the medical assistance
requirement. 167
After analyzing the statutory definition, contextual clues from the
statute, and policy considerations, the Tenth Circuit adopted the conclu-
sion of the Seventh Circuit by holding that the definition of medical as-
sistance in the Medicaid Act referred solely to financial assistance, not
actual medical services.
4. Tenth Circuit: Oklahoma Chapter of the American Academy of
Pediatrics (OKAAP) v. Fogarty
68
The OKAAP court considered three provisions of the Medicaid Act:
early and period screening, diagnostic and treatment services (EPSDT),
providing necessary care and services with reasonable promptness, and
provider reimbursements. 169
a. Facts and Procedural History
Two non-profit organizations, the OKAAP and the Community Ac-
tion Project of Tulsa County, Inc. (CAPTC), along with thirteen individ-
ual children, brought suit against the State of Oklahoma and the Okla-
homa Health Care Authority (OHCA). 70 OHCA implements and admin-
isters Oklahoma's Medicaid program.i7 1 The plaintiffs alleged that the
policies and procedures of the administration of Oklahoma's Medicaid
program "denied or deprived eligible children . . . of the health and
medical care to which they were entitled under federal law."
172
The district court conducted a bench trial and dismissed OKAAP's
claim for lack of standing. 73 In its holding, the district court found that
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1145-46.
167. Id. at 1146.
168. Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208, 1208 (10th Cir.
2007).
169. Id. at 1210. Provider reimbursement is beyond the scope of this comment, so the case




173. Id. On appeal OKAAP contended that the district court erred in dismissing the group for
lack of standing. The appeals court did not consider the issue because the court's "conclusion on the
parties' other issues, which necessitate reversal of the district court's judgment, have rendered this
issue moot." Id. at 1216.
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the State and OHCA violated the Medicaid Act by failing to ensure that
physician reimbursements for care were sufficient and by failing to fur-
nish medical assistance with reasonable promptness. 74 In reaching its
conclusion, the district court noted that the plaintiffs demonstrated that
children who needed care were not receiving it and that "system-wide
delays in treatment exist and have presented convincing evidence that
those delays are not reasonable. In violation of [the reasonable prompt-
ness requirement], defendants are not ensuring that medical assistance is
furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.'
175
The court noted that the Seventh Circuit interpreted medical assis-
tance to mean financial assistance, but distinguished the OKAAP claims
from the claims the Seventh Circuit considered. 76 In doing so, the dis-
trict court held that while the Medicaid statute only required financial
assistance, the state could still have violated the Medicaid statute's rea-
sonable promptness requirement by not providing sufficient financial
assistance. 177 The court reasoned that failing to provide sufficient finan-
cial reimbursement would mean fewer providers would accept Medicaid,




The district court ordered the plaintiffs and defendants to meet and
submit a proposed injunctive order to remedy the violations of the Medi-
caid statute on which the court would base its final order. 79 After the
court received the proposed injunctive order, the district court issued a
permanent injunction. The injunction and final judgment outlined how
the state must create and comply with a new payment scheme to "assure
reasonably prompt access to health care for minor children."' 180  Both
parties appealed. 181
b. Circuit Court Holding
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's hold-
ing.' 8 2 The court held that Oklahoma's Medicaid program did not violate
the "'reasonable promptness' requirement by allowing system-wide de-
lays in treatment of Medicaid beneficiaries .... .18 Additionally, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the comparability requirement "requires a
174. Id. at 1210. While the district court considered the reimbursement issue, reimbursement is
beyond the scope of this comment.
175. Id. at 1213-14 (quoting Okla. Chptr. of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 366 F.
Supp. 2d 1050, 1109 (D. Okla. 2005) [hereinafter OKAAP II].
176. Id. at 1214.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting OKAAP 11, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 1109).
179. Id. at 1210.
180. Id. at 1210-11 (citing Aplt. App. at 422-25).
181. Id. at 1211.
182. Id. at 1216.
183. Id. at 1209 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(8) (2008)).
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state Medicaid plan to pay for, but not to directly provide, the specific
medical services listed in the Medicaid Act."'
184
The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its holding from Mandy R. that medi-
cal assistance as provided in the Medicaid statute refers only to financial
reimbursement and not actual medical services. 185 In doing so, the Tenth
Circuit rejected the district court's ruling that the state must conduct a
study of rates and reimbursements.
In rejecting the need for a study, the Tenth Circuit noted that the
reasonable promptness requirement does not make a state Medicaid pro-
gram "directly responsible for ensuring that the medical services enu-
merated in the Medicaid Act (i.e. those that are reimbursable) are actu-
ally provided to Medicaid beneficiaries in a reasonably prompt man-
ner."
186
The Tenth Circuit recognized the district court's conclusion that low
reimbursement rates result in fewer providers which in turn creates a
longer wait time for Medicaid beneficiaries, but made an important dis-
tinction. The court noted that while reduced rates of reimbursement may
increase the time a Medicaid beneficiary must wait for treatment, that
"does not mean that defendants failed (or will fail in the future) to be
reasonably prompt in paying for services actually rendered by available
providers, as required by [the reasonable promptness requirement]. 187
Following the discussion of reasonable promptness, the Tenth Cir-
cuit rejected plaintiffs' argument that the statute created a federally en-
forceable right to receive EPSDT services. The court considered the
EPSDT argument separately because the Mandy R. court did not address
an EPSDT claim. The court again reasoned that the Medicaid Act re-
quired Oklahoma's Medicaid plan to pay for EPSDT services rather than
ensure such services were being provided or directly provide such medi-
cal services. 188
III. WHY COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AS
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari of the two Tenth
Circuit cases that held medical assistance meant financial assistance,
Mandy R. and OKAAP, and denied certiorari in the Eleventh Circuit case
that held medical assistance meant actual medical services, Doe v.
184. Id. at 1209-10.
185. Id. at 1214.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1215.
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Chiles. 189 Thus, the Supreme Court has, in effect, accepted both interpre-
tations. However, because Medicaid is a federally-funded program, and
because federal circuits interpret the Medicaid statute inconsistently, the
United States Supreme Court should grant certiorari to define medical
assistance.
The reasons for this circuit split are somewhat puzzling for a num-
ber of reasons, and the circuits holding that Medicaid programs require
actual medical services do a poor job of explaining away the disparities.
The most logical interpretation of the medical assistance provision is
provided in the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Mandy R. concluding that
medical assistance means financial assistance.
This part addresses why the financial assistance interpretation of
medical assistance is more persuasive than the actual medical services
interpretation, and why future courts should reject the notion that the
Medicaid statute requires states to provide actual medical services to
Medicaid beneficiaries. First, the legislative history behind the creation
of Medicaid points to the idea that Congress intended for Medicaid to
serve as a type of health insurance program by providing financial assis-
tance to those who could not afford medical care on their own. 190 The
language of the Medicaid statute and explanations about what Medicaid
is by CMS describe the program as a financial assistance program.'
9'
Second, and more compelling, the problems facing Medicaid are vast and
best alleviated by only requiring states to provide financial assistance.
A. Legislative History and Statutory Language
When Congress passed the Medicaid program, it defined medical
assistance "to mean payment of all or part of the cost of care and services
for [eligible] individuals.' 92 This definition only requires states to pro-
vide payment for the costs of care and services rather than provide actual
medical services. Had Congress intended for states to provide the actual
189. Mandy R. v. Ritter, 127 S. Ct. 1905 (2007); Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics
v. Fogarty, 128 S. Ct. 68 (2007); Kearney v. Does 1-13, 534 U.S. 1104 (2002). The Mandy R. v.
Ritter plaintiffs asked the Court to consider whether:
federal Medicaid law, which requires that medical assistance be furnished with reason-
able promptness to all eligible individuals and may not be less in amount, duration, and
scope to the medical assistance made available to similarly situated others, impose on a
state an obligation to ensure that the care and assistance specified in the state's Medicaid
plan is promptly furnished .... Or may the state discharge its federal Medicaid obliga-
tion by merely making prompt payment when presented with a charge for such care and
assistance ... ?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Mandy R. v. Ritter, 127 S. Ct. 1905 (2007) (No. 06-1002), 2007
WL 178418.
190. See generally STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 18.
191. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1296 d(l) (2008); see also Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
Medicaid Eligibility - Overview, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidEligibility/ (last visited Feb. 1,
2008) ("Medicaid is health insurance that helps many people who can't afford medical care pay for
some or all of their medical bills.").
192. S. REP. No. 89-404 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2020.
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medical care, surely it was familiar enough with the legislative process to
write such a requirement into the bill.
In addition, CMS recognizes that "Medicaid operates as a vendor
payment program. States may pay health care providers directly on a
fee-for-service basis, or States may pay for Medicaid services through
various prepayment arrangements ...., Because CMS is the agency
charged with administering the Medicaid program, it is a logical conclu-
sion that CMS's understanding of how the Medicaid program is run is
accurate.
Examining the history surrounding the creation of the Medicaid
statute enhances the statutory language and agency interpretation of the
Medicaid statute. The Medicaid program was an expansion of the Pub-
lic Assistance Acts of 1960, which implemented a national vendor pay-
ment system for elderly who could not pay for their medical care.1 94
Scholars have long recognized that Medicaid is a vendor payment system
and that under the program states are responsible for providing direct
reimbursement to medical providers.'95 By creating the Medicaid pro-
gram, Congress shifted public medical assistance from "a series of ven-
dor payment programs ... to . . . one (Medicaid)."' 96 In creating Medi-
caid, Congress gave states "a green light to reorganize and expand their
vendor payment schemes."' 97 Had Congress intended for states to actu-
ally provide the medical services, there would be no need for a vendor
payment system. Instead, states would use the federal matching funds to
supplement the state budget and provide additional infrastructure.
The legislative history of Medicaid, combined with the statutory
language, illustrates that Congress intended Medicaid to serve needy
individuals by providing financial assistance. The statutory language
does not require states to provide actual medical assistance, and inter-
preting the Medicaid statute as such ignores Congress's intent.
B. Lessening the Burdens on the Medicaid Program
Limited financial resources and administrative burdens are two of
the major problems facing Medicaid today. 98 Not only do these prob-
lems create challenges for the agencies administering Medicaid, but more
importantly they create access issues for eligible Medicaid beneficiaries.
As fewer physicians accept Medicaid patients because of low reim-
193. MEDICAID PROGRAM: GENERAL INFORMATION, TECHNICAL SUMMARY, supra note 34.
194. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 18, at 61.
195. Id. at66.
196. Id. at 69.
197. Id. at73.
198. Another problem plaguing the Medicaid program is fraud and abuse. A discussion of
fraud and abuse is beyond the scope of this comment. For a discussion of agency measures in place
to help combat Medicaid fraud, see generally 42 C.F.R. § 455 (2008), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MDFraudAbuseGenlnfo/.
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bursement payments, beneficiaries are forced to wait longer and travel
further for care. Interpreting the medical assistance language to mean
financial assistance will help lessen the impact of these challenges facing
Medicaid. If this interpretation does not increase access to care, it will at
least help prevent access from continuing to decline.
1. Limited Financial Resources
One of the biggest financial concerns of states in 2005 was Medi-
caid spending. In fact, "[i]n their 2005 fiscal outlooks, thirty states listed
spiraling Medicaid costs as one of their top three fiscal priorities, and
sixteen states anticipated Medicaid-induced spending overruns in
2005."' 99 In 2003, the House Energy and Commerce Committee Sub-
committee on Health held a hearing about problems facing Medicaid
("Medicaid Hearings"). Florida Governor Jeb Bush, Former Connecticut
Governor John Rowland, and New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson
testified about the fiscal challenges their states were facing as a result of
Medicaid. Governor Richardson testified "[f]rom my new vantage point,
I can tell you that the costs of this program can and do produce great
challenges for my State and all States."200
The fiscal challenges have led many states to reduce the scope of
their Medicaid programs.20' States have been forced to reduce benefits
and eligibility to Medicaid beneficiaries. At the 2003 Medicaid Hearings,
former Governor John Rowland testified that "in 22 states, including my
own, Medicaid eligibility has been reduced. Medicaid benefits have
been reduced in 22 states, and many others are seeking to implement
premiums, co-payments, preferred drug lists, and other techniques rou-
tinely applied in the private sector to contain health care costs." 202
Requiring states to provide actual medical services as opposed to fi-
nancial assistance for Medicaid beneficiaries would increase the already
cumbersome financial burdens on states. If states were forced to provide
medical care services, they would be "required to pay millions in con-
struction for publicly funded facilities., 20 3 The resources already allo-
cated to Medicaid beneficiaries would be redistributed to pay for new
hospitals and treatment centers instead of paying for the medical treat-
199. Moncrieff, supra note 1, at 673.
200. Medicaid Today: The States' Perspective: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health,
108th Cong. (2003), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/108/Hearings/03122003hearing815/print.htm (state-
ment of Honorable Bill Richardson, Governor, State of New Mexico).
201. Moncrieff, supra note 1, at 673.
202. Medicaid Today, supra note 200 (statement of Honorable John G. Rowland, Governor,
State of Connecticut).
203. Press Release, Attorney General of Colorado, Attorney General Suthers Comments on
U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Medicaid Case (Mar. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.ago.state.co.us/press-detail.cfm?presslD=846.
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ment beneficiaries need. The existing funding problems inherent in the
Medicaid structure are not because of a lack of infrastructure.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that the costs of requiring
public facilities would greatly outweigh the benefits such a policy would
provide. Medicaid beneficiaries do not live in one specific area in any
state. Rather, beneficiaries are spread out across cities and counties.
Building one Medicaid public facility in each state would not be suffi-
cient. In Colorado, for example, if only one facility was built in Denver,
Medicaid beneficiaries who did not reside in the surrounding areas, for
example a resident in Grand Junction, would have to travel for hours to
get to the public facility. Instead, if states decided to build a few facili-
ties throughout the state, the financial resources spent on infrastructure
would rise with each new facility.
2. Administrative Burdens
It has been suggested that in place of the black and white approach
of either requiring actual medical services or financial assistance courts
should instead consider the facts of each case individually "to determine
whether the plaintiffs should receive funding or be provided with ser-
vices., 204 This alternate idea to take into account a number of issues
facing Medicaid. First, the case-by-case approach ignores the financial
burdens of providing actual medical services. Second, it also fails to take
into account the already existing administrative burdens facing the Medi-
caid program, and instead, it creates more hurdles for the already vulner-
able Medicaid eligible population. Finally, this approach assumes that
courts have an in depth understanding of the administration of Medicaid
and what is best for each beneficiary.
The case-by-case approach is founded on the reasoning that:
[I]f a state chooses to include a certain benefit under its Medicaid
program and accepts federal funds for doing so, then it should ensure
that all eligible recipients receive that benefit. When all recipients
are able to receive the benefit by obtaining required services from a
public or private source, the state would then merely have to provide
the funding for that benefit .... If, however, some eligible recipients
are unable to receive the benefit, then the state should be required to
provide the actual services-instead of mere funding-so that the
benefit in question is equally available to all... 205
At first impression this reasoning seems logical. If a state provides
Medicaid services for a beneficiary, then it should ensure that all benefi-
ciaries receive the same service. However, requiring a state to provide
204. Kenneth R. Wiggins, Note, Medicaid and the Enforceable Right to Receive Medical
Assistance: The Need for a Definition of "Medical Assistance," 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1487,
1504 (2006).
205. Id. at 1507-08.
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the actual medical care is not a fiscally responsible way of implementing
Medicaid. As discussed in depth above, the financial burdens associated
with providing infrastructure for public facilities outweigh the benefits of
such a requirement.20 6
Secondly, a case-by-case approach would impose administrative
burdens on courts and Medicaid administrators. Congress foresaw that
administrative proceedings may hinder the administration of Medicaid,
and required that state plans include safeguards to assure that Medicaid
would be provided "in a manner consistent with the simplicity of admini-
stration., 20 7 Administrative burdens already plague the Medicaid system.
In the Medicaid Hearings, Florida Governor Jeb Bush described the bu-
reaucratic problems already facing the Medicaid program. Governor
Bush testified:
[B]ureaucracy is also isolating our patients from care. Providers con-
stantly complain about the difficulty of navigating patients through
the current system-with its paperwork and low fees. Patients also
must maneuver the system, and are equally discouraged. There are
costs associated with time delays, approvals, needless paperwork,
and processes for monitoring each individual component of our state
208program.
Adding courts to the administration of Medicaid would add another
hurdle to a system that is already difficult to maneuver. Requiring indi-
viduals to argue in front of the court is a cost that many could not in-
cur-both in terms of finances and in terms of time. Forcing an individ-
ual to wait for his day in court may not be reasonable if he needs imme-
diate medical assistance. Additionally, waiting for courts to rule on
whether actual services or financial assistance was the proper remedy for
each particular individual may violate the statutory reasonable prompt-
ness requirement.
The Medicaid statute requires that states promptly administer Medi-
caid. Corresponding federal regulations require states to create timeta-
bles for informing applicants of their eligibility. 20 9 Another regulatory
requirement is that the state Medicaid administrative body must "furnish
Medicaid promptly to recipients without any delay caused by the
agency's administrative procedures. 2 °10 Even circuits holding that medi-
cal assistance means actual medical services recognize and endorse this
administrative requirement. 21' Requiring courts to hear fact specific
206. See supra Section III.B. 1.
207. S. REP. NO. 89-404, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2016.
208. Medicaid Today, supra note 200 (statement of Honorable Jeb Bush, Governor, State of
Florida).
209. 42 C.F.R. § 435.91 l(a) (1996); Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 714 (1 lth Cir. 1998).
210. 42 C.F.R. § 435.930(a) (2008).
211. Chiles, 136 F.3d at 714.
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situations on case-by-case bases adds another administrative procedure to
the Medicaid program, and would create additional delay. Doing so
would violate the reasonable promptness requirement of Medicaid.
Thirdly, while the case-by-case approach strives to provide a fairer
atmosphere for eligible Medicaid recipients, surely courts would not be
able to prevent discrepancies in their rulings. This approach forces
courts to become experts on a detailed statute that is over 200 pages long,
and then apply consistent rulings affecting the medical treatment of indi-
viduals. As the system operates today, litigation about scope and access
to care already affects each Medicaid beneficiary. One scholar notes that
while litigated Medicaid cases often reflect disputes over a national
health care policy, "the outcome of each legal skirmish [affects], imme-
diately and substantially, the lives of Medicaid beneficiaries .... ,12 If
courts adopted the case-by-case approach, each individual health and
funding-related question would result in a litany of consequences for
beneficiaries who were not a party to the decision. The largest of these
consequences is perhaps inconsistency. As evident from the circuit court
split on the interpretation of medical assistance, courts are likely to inter-
pret provision of the Medicaid statute differently and often come to dif-
ferent results. Different courts that come to different conclusions about
beneficiaries who face the same or similar circumstances would not only
create unfairness, but beneficiaries would likely appeal the court's deci-
sion, leading to more and more expensive, needless litigation. Requiring
courts to become experts on the intricacies of a detailed statute and uni-
formly apply it provides another unnecessary administrative burden.
CONCLUSION
By denying certiorari on the issue of whether medical assistance
means medical services or financial assistance, the United States Su-
preme Court leaves the Medicaid program disjointed among the states.
While each state creates its own Medicaid program, states in the Elev-
enth and First Circuits are required to provide actual medical assistance
to Medicaid beneficiaries, while states in the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth
Circuits may continue their practice of providing financial services for
Medicaid beneficiaries. This circuit split creates a disparity of how fed-
eral Medicaid funds can be used in states. Some states need only provide
financial assistance with the federal funds, while other states may be
required to use the federal Medicaid funds to create public hospitals.
An analysis of the legislative history, statutory language, and prob-
lems currently plaguing Medicaid demonstrates how the program goals
are better served when medical assistance is defined as financial assis-
tance. Requiring the state to be the "service-provider of last resort"
212. Ann B. Lever, "Shake It up in a Bag": Strategies for Representing Beneficiaries in
Medicaid Litigation, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 863,863 (1991).
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would create additional burdens to an already drained system and un-
dermine the Medicaid drafters' intention.213
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